Tanya Reinhart and Irit Katriel
Mit'an (Hebrew), July 2000

     Between December 1999 and March 2000, a great hope  for
     peace with Syria  turned  into  a  big  disappointment.
     While the Israeli and most foreign media worked hard to
     portray Assad as  the  rejectionist,  it  didn't  fully
     conceal the fact that Barak never  agreed  to  withdraw
     from the Golan heights.

In December 1999, Clinton announced  the  renewal  of  the  peace
talks between Israel and Syria. The feeling in Israel  was  of  a great
historic moment. The dominant message which was conveyed by
the Israeli media was optimistic: what was seen a great hope  was
peace with Syria and quiet in the north. Peace like  with  Egypt:
Israelis can vacation in Nueiba and Dahab - They just need to  do
it as is customary between two  countries,  with  a  visa  and  a
border crossing in Eilat. The popular  media  published  articles
about tourist attractions in Damascus.

The polls indicated that most of the Israeli public agrees  to  a
withdrawal from the Golan  in  exchange  for  peace.  Even  three
months later, when the language of  imminent  peace  has  changed
into one of a "disappointment"  with  Syria,  and  the  newspaper
headlines  announced  that  "the  support   for   withdrawal   is
decreasing", the public continued to support: in a  comprehensive
poll which was conducted  by  the  Tel  Aviv  university's  Yafeh
institute for strategic research, 60% of Israelis Jews  supported
a withdrawal from ALL of the Golan in  exchange  for  peace  with
Syria. The conductor of the poll,  Prof  Asher  Arian,  explained
that this poll is more reliable than similar polls because it was
spanned over a month, and not over a week, as  is  usually  done,
people were interviewed in their homes and not  over  the  phone,
and the number of participants was large: 1201  compared  to  the
customary number of around 500.

How is it that despite the support of most of  the  Israelis,  no
agreement was realized?

This isn't, of course, the first  time  that  the  Israeli-Syrian
negotiations appeared to have entered a high gear.  The  previous
round, which began in 1994, seemed no less promising. On 11.4.94,
the main headline of Haaretz (one of  many)  announced:  "working
assumption -a full withdrawal from the Golan".  The  negotiations
lasted nearly two years. Then, too, Israel was flooded  with  "we
are with the Golan"  demonstrations,  but  in  the  negotiations,
nothing moved. Rabin insisted that they will  first  discuss  all
the details of the security  arrangements  and  demilitarization,
and postpone the discussion of the extent of the withdrawal to  a
later stage.  And  so,  after  two  years  of  negotiations,  the
committees were  still  discussing  the  position  of  the  early
warning system and managed to produce  one  unsigned  'non-paper'
which  doesn't  mention  the  word  "withdrawal",   while   Rabin
continues to invest huge sums in development and construction  on
the Golan.

It appeared that  Israel  is  planning  on  many  more  years  of
negotiations,  and  one  could  wonder  what  their  purpose  is.
Apparently, a cold status-quo has been maintained with Syria  for
years - Israel annexed the Golan, and Syria remained  quiet.  But
in fact, it was clear that without  peace,  Syria  won't  lift  a
finger against the Hizbollah, which was giving the  IDF  hell  in
Lebanon. Rabin discovered  the  alternative  recipe:  during  the
negotiations,  Syria  must  restrain  Hizbollah,  to  prove   the
seriousness of its intentions. About a week after  the  beginning
of the negotiations, we were informed  that  "Syrian  army  units
raided Hizbollah strongholds and  confiscated  weapons"  (Haaretz
19.4.94).

During the two years of negotiations, there was relative quiet in
Lebanon, and it appeared that it is possible  to  impose  on  the
Syrians the same tactics that Rabin played on the Palestinians  -
endless negotiations, during which the other  side  replaces  the
IDF in the police work of the occupation. But in 1996  Assad  was
fed up, and he withdrew from  the  negotiations.  Gradually,  the
disasters for the IDF in Lebanon renewed.

The feeling in December 1999 was that this peace  round  will  be
different. This time, "the agreement is almost all done" and will
be achieved by short negotiations.  It  seemed  that  things  are
moving ahead at a high pace. On 16.12.99 the two sides met for  a
ceremony on the white  house  lawn  and  in  January,  they  were
already engaged in intensive talks in Shepherdstown. But then  it
all stopped.

Since the closing of the Shepherdstown meeting (on 9.1.00)  there
were no negotiations and in the Clinton-Assad summit in Geneva on
26.3.00 the death of the process was declared.

The formal explanation which was given for  the  failure  of  the
talks was Assad's insistence on controlling a small strip of land
on the Kinneret shore. But examining the  formal  documents,  and
what appeared  in  the  media,  reveals  a  completely  different
picture.

DECEMBER 1999: FROM WASHINGTON TO Shepherdstown

The basic assumption in the Israeli public's  perception  of  the
process was that Israel is willing to withdraw from  all  of  the
Golan (excluding a small strip of land on  the  Kinneret  shore).
But what is the source of this assumption? Not Barak's  speeches.
He never said "withdrawal from  the  Golan"  or  "dismantling  of
settlements". An example of  the  artwork  of  creating  a  wrong
perception: in Yediot of  10.12.99,  the  main  title  announced:
"Barak on the Golan settlers: they will leave their  homes  after
fulfilling a historic mission". On page two, the exact quote from
Barak's speech at the labor center meeting appears,  and  doesn't
include one word about evacuation - only about the importance  of
the settlers: "They built a home, and vineyard and  village,  and
if it weren't for their work, determination and moral stature  it
wouldn't have been possible to begin negotiations with Syria, and
we would have been now without security and without the Golan. We
are all deeply  connected  to  the  Golan's  landscapes,  to  the
settlement mission on the Golan, which was mostly done by  people
who were sent by our party. I say to the people of the Golan:  we
take your hand in appreciation of what you did."

The only source for interpreting  his  words  as  willingness  to
withdraw is: "Following the speech of the prime  minister  ...  a
senior  minister  said:  'It's  all  over,  they  need  to  start
evacuating' ".

Barak  maintained  the  same  vagueness  when  he  left  for  the
Shepherdstown discussions. At the airport, he  announced:  "I  am
leaving on a mission of the whole nation, to bring peace,  and  I
am moved by the scope of the responsibility. This is where  Anwar
Sadat landed, and from here Menachem Begin departed to make peace
with Egypt." (Haaretz 3.1.00). This is what was absorbed  in  the
public's perception: the  analogy  with  the  peace  treaty  with
Egypt. But if we pay attention, we will see that the only analogy
is exactly what was said: that in the Egypt affairs  there  were,
naturally, departures and landings at the same  Tel-Aviv  airport
that Barak was leaving to Shepherdstown from.

Here is the rest of his  speech  (as  quoted  by  Yediot  of  the
3.1.00): "Nobody knows what the border line will be" (a  position
which he will repeat all  along  the  Shepherdstown  discussions)
"but I did not  hide  that  there  is  a  painful  price  for  an
agreement, and we will not sign one for any price. We  are  going
towards a difficult agreement, but  one  which  is  necessary  to
bring an end to the era of wars. I lost many friends on the Golan
and this doesn't come easy to me. It hurts me a lot to talk about
the Golan". If  you  want,  you  can  interpret  this  pain  over
discussing the Golan as willingness to give it up. But  the  only
thing which Barak explicitly promises at the end of his speech is
that "we will not sign an agreement which will not strengthen, in
our opinion, the security of Israel". And he kept this promise  -
he indeed didn't sign any agreement.

THE Shepherdstown DOCUMENT

At the end of the Shepherdstown meeting  (8.1.00)  the  mediators
prepared  a  summary  document  (which  was  supposed  to  remain
confidential) that outlines the positions of both sides. The Arab
language newspaper Al Hayat printed on 9.1.00 a summary  of  this
document, based on Syrian sources. Israel denied the authenticity
of the summary and exposed the full document  to  the  media.  It
appeared in Haaretz and Yediot on 13.1.00  Comparing  the  Syrian
version with the Israeli version is highly revealing.

>From examining the Syrian  version,  it  appears  that  peace  is
indeed reachable. First, it appears that the border  dispute  can
be resolved: It has been often claimed in the Israeli media  that
the debate remaining between the Israeli and  Syrian  negotiators
regards a small strip of land between  the  international  border
(Israel's position) and the border at the time of the 67 war (the
'June 4' line - Syria's position). The importance of  this  strip
is in the control over water sources.  The  news  in  the  Syrian
version of the document is the clause  that  "Syria  acknowledges
that the June 4th line is not a border  and  is  not  drawn,  and
therefore is willing to cooperate in drawing the lines". (Section
A: "borders  committee").  Interpreters  in  Israel  viewed  this
clause as signaling that Syria may be willing  to  compromise  on
this issue, and perhaps will agree to symbolic water gestures, as
was the case in the agreements with Jordan.

Another claimed area of dispute has been the nature of the  peace
relations. On this, Syria proposes  now  "to  constitute  regular
peace relations, as between two neighboring  countries"  (Section
B: "the normal peace relations"). That is, peace like with Egypt.

As for the security  concerns  of  Israel,  Syria  "welcomes  the
presence of international forces under  the  US  command  in  the
Golan Heights" (Section C: "security  arrangements").  Even  more
significant, in this respect, is what's behind the screen:  Syria
is committed to make sure that the  Hizbollah  will  not  operate
against civilians in the Israeli North, and has already passed  a
painful test,  when  Lebanese  children  were  bombarded  in  the
Southern Lebanon village Arab Salim. Syria prevented retaliations
against Israeli civilians (which were permitted in case civilians
are targeted in Southern Lebanon, according to the terms  of  the
agreement reached between Israel and the Hizbollah following  the
1996 'Grapes of Wrath' war).

There is no doubt that the Syrian leak to El Hayat indicated  its
readiness for peace.

However, the full version of this document reveals how  far  away
agreement is (contrary to Syria which published a summary, Israel
published  the  full  text   of   the   document).   During   the
Shepherdstown talks it was reported that Barak refused to  commit
himself to a border line and like Rabin before him, insisted that
the borders issue will be  discussed  only  in  the  end  of  the
negotiations. This stand is confirmed in the document.  All  that
the document says about the border line is that "the location  of
the border line will be determined by taking security  and  other
considerations into account..." (section I).

Let us examine the relevant parts of the document.

     Section  I  -  establishing  peace  and   security   in
     recognized borders
     1. The state of war between Israel and Syria  now  ends
     and peace is established between them. The  sides  will
     maintain normal peace relations as defined  in  section
     III.
     2. The  international,  secure  and  recognized  border
     between Israel (I) and Syria (S) is the border  defined
     in section II. The position of the  border  was  agreed
     between the sides (S: based on the June 4th 1967 lines)
     (I: will be determined by  taking  security  and  other
     considerations into account, as well as  other  crucial
     considerations  of   both   sides   and   their   legal
     considerations). The state of Israel will (S: withdraw)
     (I:  redeploy)  all  its  military   forces   (S:   and
     civilians) behind this border  line  according  to  the
     appendix to this agreement. (S:  from  this  point  on,
     each side with exercise its  full  sovereignty  on  its
     side of  the  international  border,  on  top  of  what
     appears in this agreement).

     Section II - the international border
     1. The international border between Israel and Syria is
     as appears in the maps in the appendix - this border is
     the permanent,  secure,  and  recognized  international
     border between Israel and Syria, and comes  to  replace
     any other border or boundary between them.
                                          (Haaretz, 13.1.00)

The document is a draft prepared by the US for a peace treaty, if
and when it will be signed. It outlines a general framework,  but
marks by parentheses the points on which Israel (I) and Syria (S)
differ. On the borders  issue,  the  document  refers  us  to  an
unnumbered appendix. Meaning, an appendix which doesn't exist yet
and which is to include the maps that will  be  agreed  upon.  At
this stage, Israel hasn't even offered yet a draft for  the  map,
and only provided the general phrasing that we mentioned.

But what really reveals what Barak was willing to give for  peace
is the meaning he gives to this mysterious border line which will
be determined at the end of negotiations:  throughout  the  whole
document the Israeli version stresses that after the peace treaty
there will be no "withdrawal"  of  the  Israeli  army,  but  only
"redeployment of forces".  The  difference  might  appear  to  be
semantic, but the experience of the Oslo accords, in which Israel
committed only to redeployment, reveals its  meaning:  withdrawal
entails complete evacuation  of  military  and  civilian  forces,
including dismantling of settlements, and  shifting  sovereignty,
while redeployment  means  only  moving  the  forces  outside  of
certain areas, thus maintaining control of the occupying side.

Indeed, Israel insists that only military forces, but  no  Israel
civilians, will be redeployed in the  Golan  Heights,  while  the
Syrian version explicitly mentions  withdrawal  of  military  and
civilian forces. Meaning, the document reaffirms  what  has  been
reported on other occasions in the Israeli media: Israel did  not
commit to the evacuation of a single  settlement  on  the  Golan.
Israel's intentions to leave the  settlements  intact  appear  in
another place in the document:

     Section III - normal peace relations Appendix - defines
     the agreed procedures for establishing  and  developing
     these  relations  (I:  including  the  time  frame  for
     finalizing   the   necessary   agreements    and    the
     arrangements  for  the  inhabitants  and  the   Israeli
     settlements in the areas from which the military forces
     will be moved according to section I) (S: ?)

All Israel has offered, then, is a meaningless redeployment which
will leave the Israeli settlers  and  settlements  in  place.  To
remove all doubt, let's look again at section I: Israel does  not
accept the Syrian position that after the moving of forces  "each
side will exercise its sovereignty in its side  of  the  border".
So, whatever line will eventually be declared  as  'border',  the
sovereignty over the Golan Heights will remain Israeli.

In the meantime, not only  did  the  construction  on  the  Golan
continue all through the negotiations, but immediately  when  the
talks began, the Golan was awarded priority A status, which gives
it preference for development (Yediot 17.12.99).

After Israel published the full text of the document  (which  was
supposed to remain confidential), the  Syrians  suddenly  stopped
the  negotiations.  (When  the  Shepherdstown  round  ended,  the
Israeli media mentioned a second round to be convened  soon,  but
the Syrians did not return to the  negotiation  table).  How  can
this be explained? It is reasonable to believe that Assad knew in
advance, that Barak has no intention of offering  him  more  than
Rabin's concept of endless negotiations. This is  why  he  wasn't
enthusiastic, at first, about renewing the negotiations,  and  as
was mentioned again and again in the Israeli  and  US  media,  it
took massive pressure to bring him back to the negotiating table.
In normal circumstances, the need for this pressure seems strange
- He is offered all of the Golan with withdrawal from Lebanon; he
is offered a water  arrangement  with  Turkey,  and  he  refuses:
Without threats and pressure he won't agree  to  have  the  Golan
back. But assuming that all he was offered  was  to  continue  to
fight Israel's war with Hizbollah in return  for  a  Rabin  style
peace show, it is understandable why pressure was necessary.

Assad gave in to the pressure, because  he  was  threatened,  not
only with severing of the economic sanctions in the  midst  of  a
drought year, but also with a Kosovo  style  war:  the  IDF  will
leave Lebanon unilaterally, and with the first  katyusha  on  the
Galilee (which even Assad cannot control) the  West  will  be  at
peace seeking Israel's side when it will attack Syria.

Barak,  at  least,  mentioned  his  Kosovo  vision   on   several
occasions. Already in July 1999  he  said:  "I  am  confident  in
entering agreements when the IDF is very  strong,  equipped  with
the most advanced systems in the world, the type which enabled in
Kosovo, for the first time in History, to lead a war  which  will
bring the surrender of a local dictator without one  casualty  on
the attacker's side." (Aluf Ben, Haaretz, 27.7.99, page 3b).  But
this isn't only about words. All through  the  negotiations,  the
IDF held extensive maneuvers on the Golan,  which  simulated  war
with Syria. During the Shepherdstown meeting,  we  were  informed
that the IDF is holding the fifth maneuver in this series.  (Amir
Oren, Haaretz 14.1.00). What would  have  Israel  said  if  Syria
would have done the same during negotiations?

But the carrot beside  the  Kosovo  stick  was  the  negotiations
excuse and the appearance that Israel is  indeed  considering  to
give up the Golan. With these, Assad could justify to his  people
the continuation of the talks. In  this  spirit,  he  ordered  to
publish an optimistic version of headway  at  Shepherdstown.  The
publishing of the full Shepherdstown document canceled  even  the
appearance. Even if the contents of the document didn't  sink  in
the Israeli public perception, it  was  published  all  over  the
world and it was no longer possible for the  Syrians  to  pretend
that they believe that Barak is close  to  giving  up  the  Golan
heights. Assad decided to leave the talks.

MARCH 2000: THE CLINTON-ASSAD SUMMIT

Clinton summoned Assad to a summit meeting in Geneva on  26.3.00.
Before this summit, the media went  a  long  way  to  depict  the
negotiations as stuck due to Syrian stubbornness.  In  Yediot  of
24.3.00, a large lettered title for an article by Shimon  Shiffer
said "Clinton will tell Assad: it is your turn to  be  flexible".
But in the article itself  we  read  that  American  sources  are
saying that their problem "is that Barak is not willing  to  give
us clear answers regarding the withdrawal to  the  June  4,  1967
lines, as Assad demands. He prefers to wrap his position by vague
statements  about  what  his  predecessors  have  committed   to,
commitments which he cannot erase, and we are left  to  interpret
his hints and convey them to Damascus." Barak is quoted  in  this
article as saying "I will not give any  political  commitment  to
Assad before we know exactly what we will get in return..."

And indeed, the summit  failed.  The  Israeli  and  most  of  the
foreign media continued the line it  started:  Assad  refused  to
compromise on the Kinneret shore, and by this said a definite  no
to peace. They topped this by stating  that  this  was  his  last
chance to reach an agreement with Israel.

But along this version, another one appeared: the one  which  was
reported by Robert Fisk in the British  Independent  on  26.3.00:
"The two men held three hours of talks, through interpreters,  at
the Intercontinental Hotel in  Geneva,  with  the  Syrian  leader
patiently explaining he was not  going  to  fall  into  the  same
'peace' trap as  the  Palestine  Liberation  Organization  leader
Yasser  Arafat.  He  will  not  make  peace  with  Israel  before
guaranteeing the return of all of the occupied Golan, captured by
Israel in the 1967 Middle East war.  Mr  Arafat  signed  a  peace
settlement then failed to gain a majority of  the  occupied  West
Bank or a capital in Jerusalem."

In this narrative, the dispute is not over the 500 meters at  all
("it was conveyed on behalf  of  Assad  that  he  is  willing  to
compromise on the withdrawal  line,  and  even  to  full  Israeli
control over the whole of the Kineret shore, while continuing  to
negotiate water rights"). The dispute is over the  model  of  the
peace. There are two models  in  our  history:  in  the  Egyptian
model, all stages of the withdrawal and guarantees were finalized
before the treaty was signed (the  later  discussions  surrounded
the autonomy for the Palestinians). The  withdrawal  was  set  to
spread over  three  years,  and  only  after  2/3  of  Sinai  was
evacuated, embassies were set up. The Taba issue  remained.  Both
sides held it precious, and the  Israelis  used  to  spend  their
vacations on its shores. That's why the decision regarding it was
left for the end.

In the Arafat model, the Oslo agreement was  signed  with  almost
nothing agreed upon, besides Israeli  declarations  of  principle
about willingness for a withdrawal. Seven years later,  it  turns
out that the Palestinians have halted the Intifadah,  but  Arafat
didn't get anything of what was promised to him in the west bank.
What was realized was the autonomy plan  which  the  Palestinians
always rejected. Assad said that he will agree to a  Sadat  style
peace, and not to an Arafat style one. Barak is demanding that he
will first sign, open embassies  and  fight  the  Hizbollah.  And
then, if we will be satisfied, we  will  withdraw.  This  is  the
Arafat model. Barak does not agree to the Sadat model.

Yediot of the 27.3.00 also reported that Syrian sources said that
Assad brought with him to Geneva "a  compromise  offer  regarding
normalization", and that  he  had  agreed  to  an  early  warning
station on the Hermon which  will  be  staffed  by  American  and
French technicians, along with some from a "third  party",  which
could include Israelis. But this appeared in the  small  letters.
The titles announced that "The summit with Assad failed"  on  the
first page and "Assad said no" in huge letters on pages 2 and 3.

To remove any doubt as to who is to blame for the collapse of the
talks, Nahum Barnea provided an analysis in the  same  newspaper,
in which he described the summit as a slap on the face which  the
ego driven Assad gave to Clinton, and added: "Syria belongs to  a
type of country which is disappearing. The moustache type.  Assad
brought with him to Geneva some dozens of  such  moustaches,  who
sat yesterday in the Hotel lobby, whispered  to  each  other  and
were really frightened whenever  a  non-Syrian  approached  them.
Tyrant regimes can probably last, for years. If Sadam Hussein  is
lasting in Iraq, there is no reason why Assad will  not  last  in
Syria..."

Beyond  the  demonizing  which  describes  people  as  frightened
moustaches with whom we certainly cannot achieve peace deals,  it
is worthwhile to  remember  that  during  the  gulf  war,  Saddam
Houssein was compared to  Hitler,  an  analogy  which  was  based
mainly on his moustache. Now, Assad is compared to  Hitler  based
on the moustache analogy Assad is Saddam is Hitler.  Barnea,  the
senior reporter who accompanies Barak in  his  travels,  gives  a
good illustration of the tones with which the  media  accompanied
the negotiations with Syria. Already  at  the  first  meeting  in
Washington all we heard was how  A-Shara  is  primitive,  doesn't
understand the feelings of the Israelis, and  is  not  a  serious
candidate for peace at all.

If anyone in Israel really intended to bring about some kind of a
historic compromise with Syria, there was not a  single  evidence
for this  intention,  either  in  the  media  or  in  the  formal
documents.